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 Preface 
 
The present volume collects papers that were presented at the 34th Interna-
tional Wittgenstein Symposium “Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Dis-
agreement” 2011 in Kirchberg. Only a few years ago, influential philoso-
phers proclaimed the death of epistemology. Their verdict proved to be 
false. Today, the theory of knowledge flourishes as perhaps never before. 
The Kirchberg Symposium 2011 focused on some of the most recent de-
bates and developments in current epistemology: (epistemic) contextualism 
and invariantism; epistemic virtues; the value of knowledge; testimony; 
and the structure and importance of rational disagreement. Finally, a large 
section whose topics were not required to focus on general epistemology 
was devoted to the work of the great intellectual patron of the annual sym-
posia, Ludwig Wittgenstein.  
Epistemology not only enjoys great prominence among professional phi-
losophers. The discipline has become so popular in recent years that even 
influential politicians have been seduced by the attractions of epistemo-
logical reasoning. Recall a by now famous statement from a public figure 
who – wittingly or not – introduced the intricacies of epistemological rea-
soning to a world wide audience. “There are known knowns”, the person in 
question reasoned, “there are things we know we know. We also know 
there are known unknowns. That is to say, we know there are some things 
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we 
don’t know we don’t know. – And ... it is the latter ... that tend to be the 
difficult ones.” (Donald Rumsfeld, quoted from “The Economist”, Decem-
ber 4, 2003; for live footage see www.youtube.com.) Throughout the 
world, this statement quickly became a most useful means in introductory 
classes for piquing the epistemology student’s interest. What does it mean 
to know something? What are the conditions for knowing that one knows, 
and for knowing that one fails to know? What makes an ordinary knowl-
edge attribution true? And, we may ask, is it really true that only “unknown 
unknowns” are “the difficult ones”? Epistemology aims at answering such 
questions, and it helps us disentangle arguments and statements presented 
outside the philosophy classroom as well.  
Though not all statements about knowledge in non-philosophical con-
texts are as accessible as might be desirable, knowledge itself may be eas-
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ier to achieve in everyday contexts than in the seminar. This, at least, is 
what epistemic contextualists maintain. Ordinary knowledge attributions, 
they claim, are typically true in quotidian contexts, yet the same knowl-
edge attributions are false in demanding, and especially in sceptical, con-
texts. The pros and cons of this view are the topic of the section “Contex-
tualism and Invariantism”. – It was a comforting experience that many 
speakers and guests seemed to have no trouble in switching from demand-
ing philosophy classroom contexts to quotidian contexts, and that knowl-
edge attributions to the effect that people knew that the local pubs exist 
proved to be true in the evenings.  
Discussions such as these take us into the normative realm of questions 
about good epistemic (and linguistic) behaviour. In recent years, epistemo-
logists have broadened the perspective on such questions by investigating 
what they call “epistemic” or, more broadly, “intellectual virtues”. What is 
the nature of such virtues, and how are they connected to our cardinal epis-
temic goal to “reach the truth” (or, more precisely, to acquire and maintain 
true beliefs while avoiding false ones in matters of significance)? When 
should we credit people for what they believe, and how are epistemic vir-
tues conceptually connected with other, especially moral or other practical 
virtues? Such are the questions of our section on virtue epistemology.  
Many epistemologists will not agree with the claim from the above quo-
tation that only “unknown unknowns” are “the difficult ones”. Many would 
agree however that it is good to have knowledge, at least concerning non-
trivial matters of practical significance. Often it seems better to have 
knowledge than mere true belief. (In other words: it would often seem bet-
ter to possess knowns than to possess unknowns, even if the latter are con-
stituted by true beliefs.) But why exactly would that be so? In particular, 
why does knowledge seem to be more valuable than mere true belief? This 
question, too, has recently gained centre stage in analytical epistemology. It 
is extensively discussed in the contributions represented in the section 
“The Nature and Value of Knowledge”.  
Proceeding from within a broadly Cartesian perspective, epistemology 
traditionally focused on issues such as the nature and content of subjective 
epistemic obligations, the structure of internal justification, and the meth-
ods of individual knowledge acquisition. Only fairly recently philosophers 
have begun to take seriously the fact that in many, if not most epistemic 
settings knowledge acquisition is essentially a social enterprise. Most of 
our (true) beliefs rely upon the testimony of others. Social epistemology 
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has begun to systematize such observations, and in recent years episte-
mologists have developed detailed theories of testimonial knowledge. This 
is the topic of our section on testimony. 
Philosophers, too, must for the greater part of their belief-forming lives 
rely on others. Yet they very much like to quarrel, and often only agree that 
they disagree. What epistemologists don’t agree upon is when it is rational 
to disagree. Even more interesting and intricate is the question whether 
there can be rational disagreement among (mutually acknowledged) epis-
temic peers – people whom one takes to be more or less as well informed, 
competent, etc., regarding a given topic as one takes oneself to be. How 
should we react if, as it often happens, we find ourselves in persisting dis-
agreement with acknowledged epistemic peers? Should we let this weaken 
or maybe even defeat our justification (or epistemic entitlement, warrant, 
etc.) for what we believe, or are we entitled in such situations to stick to 
our guns? This is one of the hottest topics in current epistemology, thus our 
section on “disagreement”.  
Finally, there is Wittgenstein. For decades, Wittgenstein scholars have 
been coming to Kirchberg in order to discuss the work and life of this out-
standing figure of analytical philosophy. In this tradition, the biggest sec-
tion of this year’s symposium was once more the Wittgenstein section, 
with many contributions devoted to epistemological issues in Wittgen-
stein’s Œuvre.  
May the present volume contribute to creating demanding epistemologi-
cal contexts in which we value knowledge and understanding, explore in-
tellectual virtues, learn from the testimony of our colleagues and engage in 
constructive peer disagreement.  
We thank all the speakers and contributors to this volume and congratu-
late Matthew Lee and Wolfgang Freitag for having won the Leinfellner 
award, sponsored by the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society and Dr. 
Rafael Hüntelmann from Ontos publishers. Thanks to all our co-organizers 
and supporters in Kirchberg for their great engagement. Special thanks go 
to Mag. Monika Datterl’s super-efficient and competent lay-outing and 
typesetting; to Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann for his patience; to Mag. Margret 
Kronaus and her crew for their excellent organisation of all the small and 
big practical issues in Kirchberg; and to the board of the Austrian Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Society for committing to us the society’s 2011 symposium.  
Innsbruck, June 2012 Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Contextualism and Invariantism 
 

 Knowledge, Contextualism,  
and Moorean Paradox 
ELKE BRENDEL, University of Bonn 
Abstract 
The paper gives a comparative overview of contextualist, relativist and 
subject-sensitive invariantist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that none 
of these theories can provide a satisfying semantics for knowledge ascrip-
tions. It is shown that there are crucial dissimilarities between “know” and 
indexical or context-sensitive terms. In particular, contextualists, relativ-
ists, and subject-sensitive invariantists are committed to some kind of 
Moorean paradoxes. 
1. Introduction 
In contemporary epistemology, there is an ongoing debate about the proper 
semantic analysis of the term “know”. Many recent epistemologists defend 
the view that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions of the form “S 
knows that p (at t)” (where “S” refers to an epistemic subject, “p” to a 
proposition, and “t” to a point in time) depend inter alia on certain epis-
temic standards for “know”, i.e., besides the truth of p and S’s belief that 
p, it is also required that S meets certain epistemic standards in order to 
know that p. Epistemologists, however, strongly disagree about the exact 
features that determine epistemic standards and about whose epistemic 
standards are decisive for the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions.  
There are three different epistemic contexts with respect to knowledge 
ascriptions: First of all, there is the context of the epistemic subject S her-
self which is determined by, for example, S’s interests, expectations, S’s 
practical costs of being wrong about p, etc. Second, there is the context of 
the knowledge ascriber, i.e., the context of the speaker or the context of the 
person who utters the knowledge-ascription. In the following, I will call 
this context the context of utterance, abbreviated with cu. Apart from cases 
of knowledge self-ascription where the epistemic subject is identical with 
